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MOTHERS, MYTHS, AND THE LAW OF DIVORCE: ONE
MORE FEMINIST CASE FOR PARTNERSHIP
CYNTHIA LEE STARNES*
What was once thought can never be unthought.'
Since the early days of no-fault divorce, family law has embraced
a vision of marriage as a companionate relationship in which spouses
make equal or similar contributions to work and home.2 Grudgingly,
the law has begun to concede that this egalitarian model is some-
times more aspirational than real. Traditional marriages still exist,
and when they fail after many years, equity often demands a remedy
not contemplated by no-fault's clean-break philosophy.3 Also incon-
sistent with an egalitarian model are the many quasi-traditional
marriages in which two wage-earning spouses divide domestic respon-
sibilities along gender lines in ways that, over time, reduce a mother's
earning capacity.4
The disconnect between a normative model of egalitarian mar-
riage and real marriage was made startlingly clear in a recent study
by Virginia sociologists Bradford Wilcox and Steven Nock. Expecting
to find that women were happiest in marriages marked by egalitari-
anism,5 the researchers instead found that women, including those
with egalitarian beliefs about marriage, were happiest in marriages
marked by traditional gender roles.6 While the explanation for this
finding is unclear, the finding itself undercuts the law's marriage
* Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. Thanks to Jane
Edwards, Hildur Hanna, and Barbara Bean for their excellent research support.
1. FRIEDRICHDORRENMATT, THE PHYSICISTS 92 (James Kirkruptrans., Grove Press,
Inc. 1964) (1962).
2. In an egalitarian (companionate) marriage model, "spouses share similar work
and family responsibilities" and patriarchal authority is eliminated. W. Bradford Wilcox
& Steven L. Nock, What's Love Got to Do with It? Equality, Equity, Commitment and
Women's Marital Quality, 84 Soc. FORCES 1321, 1322 (2006).
3. SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY 162-63 (1989).
4. For a discussion of the reduction in earning capacity associated with motherhood,
see infra Part II.A.
5. Wilcox & Nock, supra note 2, at 1323. For an interesting commentary on this
study, see John Tierney, The Happiest Wives, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2006, at A19 (suggest-
ing that women do more housework than men partly because housework is more impor-
tant to women).
6. Wilcox & Nock, supra note 2, at 1328, 1332 (finding support for the hypothesis
that even wives with egalitarian attitudes "will be happier in marriages with gender-
typical practices"); see also id. at 1340 ("... [WIomen are not happier in marriages
marked by egalitarian practices and beliefs.').
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model. If even egalitarian-minded women are assuming and taking
comfort in gender-based roles within their own homes, the law's equal-
contribution model of marriage has it wrong. The point, of course, is
not that egalitarian marriage is a bad idea. To the contrary, mar-
riages in which spouses actually match the hours and energy they
devote to market and family work signal an abandonment of gender-
determinative roles that has long been the goal of many feminists.'
The problem, however, is that conflation of aspiration and reality es-
tablishes a fictional baseline of appropriate behavior against which
legal actors judge real spouses, often unsympathetically.
Reexamination of the egalitarian model of marriage begins with
identification of three myths that support it. These myths' are simple
enough: mothering just happens, mothering is free, and mothering
7. Id. at 1322.
8. These myths are recognizable themes in The Great Mother Archetype of Jungian
fame, a point made clear to me in a conversation with Alden Josey. Telephone interview
with Alden Josey, Jungian analyst, (Feb. 2002). For a sample of Josey's work, see Alden
Josey, Burn in Water, Wash in Fire: Paradox and Ambiguity in the Work of Individuation,
in MIRRORS OF TRANSFORMATION 3 (Dolores Elise Brien ed., 1995). For more on The Great
Mother Archetype, see generally ERICH NEUMANN, THE GREAT MOTHER (Ralph Manheim
trans., Princeton University Press 2d ed. 1963) (1955).
A very different kind of myth about mothers is described in SUSAN J. DOUGLAS &
MEREDITH W. MICHAELS, THE MOMMY MYTH: THE IDEALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD AND
How IT HAS UNDERMINED WOMEN (2004). Douglas and Michaels are concerned about
the rise of the "new momism:"
the insistence that no woman is truly complete or fulfilled unless she has
kids, that women remain the best primary caretakers of children, and that
to be a remotely decent mother, a woman has to devote her entire physical,
psychological, emotional, and intellectual being, 24/7, to her children. The
new momism is a highly romanticized and yet demanding view of motherhood
in which the standards for success are impossible to meet.
Id. at 4. The myth Douglas and Michaels describe burdens real mothers by demanding
that they become impossible figures of perfect motherhood. The myths described in this
article, by contrast, are myths that prevent observers from seeing real mothers as they
actually are.
9. This article assumes the broadest definition of "mothering." Mothering thus
includes both direct care of children and more tangentially related activities that main-
tain the home in which children live. Under this definition, mothering thus includes
"physical care; playing with children; reading to children; assistance with homework;
attending children's events; taking care of children's health care needs; and dropping
off, picking up, and waiting for children." BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, USDL No. 05-1766, AMERICAN TIME-USE SURvEY, TECHNICAL NOTES (2004)
(defining primary childcare). Mothering also includes Katharine Silbaugh's description
of housework: "preparing meals, washing dishes, house cleaning, outdoor tasks, shop-
ping, washing and ironing, paying bills, auto maintenance, driving... making coffee,
feeding the baby, emptying garbage, answering the telephone, planning family activi-
ties, making beds, caring for pets, weeding, sweeping floors ... putting clothes away."
Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1, 11 (1996-97)).
Mothering need not be gender specific, i.e., a father could (and many fathers do)
undertake mothering. As Sara Ruddick has observed, "a child is mothered by whoever
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is for babies. Each of these myths has an innocent, child-like quality
that contributes to its seductiveness. Yet these myths are far from
harmless. Taken together, they ensure that the daily realities of
mothers' work, the economic consequences of that work and its value
do not receive serious attention. Myth thus conveniently casts divorc-
ing mothers and fathers as equally positioned at divorce, a posture
consistent with the premise of egalitarian marriage, which then
justifies the economic clean-break philosophy of no-fault divorce.1 °
For real women who have lost earning capacity because of family
responsibilities, mother myths pose great danger, threatening to
seduce even fair-minded judges into distorted notions of equity.'1
protects, nurtures, and trains her." Sara Ruddick, Thinking Mothers/Conceiving Birth,
in REPRESENTATIONS OFMOTHERHOOD 29,35 (Donna Bassin et al. eds., 1994). As women
are overwhelmingly the primary caretakers of children, this article focuses on women.
See infra Part I.A. Reserved for another day is the possibility that fathers, like mothers,
are subject to father myths that undercut their work in the family.
10. See generally OKIN, supra note 3, at 161-63.
11. In our hugely discretionary divorce regime, individual trial courts are typically
directed by statute to achieve economic equity by dividing marital property and award-
ing alimony in a way that seems fair. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, for example,
authorizes trial courts to "equitably apportion" marital property. UNIF. MARRIAGE &
DIVORCE ACT § 307, 9A U.L.A. 288 (1998) (Alternative A) [hereinafter UMDA]. Typically,
courts are directed to consider all relevant factors in determining what equity requires.
The UMDA, for example, directs the court to consider:
the duration of the marriage, and prior marriage of either party, antenuptial
agreement of the parties, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and
sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and
needs of each of the parties, custodial provisions, whether the apportionment
is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance, and the opportunity of each for
future acquisition of capital assets and income.
Id. Also relevant is "the contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition,
preservation, depreciation, or appreciation in value of the respective estates, and the
contribution of a spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit." Id. The UMDA neither
defines "need" nor specifies appropriate weights for the various factors. See id.
Alimony decisionmaking is even more discretionary. Courts are typically authorized
to award alimony to a needy spouse in an amount and for a duration the court deems
"equitable" after considering relevant factors. The UMDA, for example, authorizes (but
does not require) a court to award alimony to a spouse who: "(1) lacks sufficient property
to provide for his reasonable needs; and (2) is unable to support himself through appro-
priate employment or is the custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances make
it appropriate that the custodian not be required to seek employment outside the home."
Id. § 308(a). Once a claimant establishes need, a court may order alimony "in amounts
and for periods of time the court deems just," after considering:
(1) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including
marital property apportioned to him, his ability to meet his needs indepen-
dently, and the extent to which a provision for support of a child living with
the party includes a sum for that party as custodian;
(2) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable
the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment;
(3) the standard of living established during the marriage;
(4) the duration of the marriage;
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While debunking mother myths and abandoning the false egali-
tarian model they support is an important beginning, it is not enough.
A new model of marriage must replace the old. A better model must
reflect the reality of gender roles without entrenching those roles,
embrace spousal equality rather than patriarchy, and understand
the difference between equality in status and identity of contribution.
Such a model comes from an analogy to the rules and principles of
partnership. Partnership offers a gender-neutral vocabulary and an
equality-based model for marriage. It also offers the essential lesson
that spouses can be equally invested in the risks, losses, and gains
of marriage even though their contributions to marriage differ in
kind and quantity.
The urgency of this reexamination of marital norms is under-
scored by publication of the American Law Institute's PRINCIPLES
OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION. 12 In these PRINCIPLES, the ALI
offers a helpful framework for state laws that create entitlements
to post-divorce income sharing."8 The danger, of course, is that state
rulemakers will be as seduced by mother myths as their predeces-
sors. At worst, new statutes will memorialize these myths, creating
modernized, bright-line divorce regimes that punish mothers with
even greater certainty than the discretionary regimes of current
law. This risk, together with the inequitable treatment of divorcing
mothers under current law,'4 prompts this examination of the un-
acknowledged role of mother myths in divorce.
Parts I through III of this article each describe a mother myth,
subject that myth to a reality check, explain its impact on the law
of divorce, and gauge the ALI's response as a sometimes eager, some-
times reluctant, myth slayer. Part IV briefly presents a myth-free
alternative marriage model drawn from an analogy to partnership.
(5) the age and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking
maintenance; and
(6) the ability of the [payor] spouse ... to meet his needs while meeting
those of the spouse seeking maintenance.
Id. § 308(b). The very broad judicial discretion inherent in such schemes invites courts
to rely on internal moral codes and on the myths addressed in this article.
12. ALI, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION (2000) [hereinafter
PRINCIPLES].
13. The ALI leaves the details of these laws to individual rulemakers. As the com-
mentary to the PRINCIPLES explains, "[i]n many cases, implementation of a Principle
requires policy choices at a more detailed level than the Principle itself resolves. In such
cases the Principle typically requires the adoption of statewide rules that address the
matter on a more detailed level." Id. § 1.01 cmt. a. The appropriate rulemaker may be
a legislature, court or administrative agency, depending on the rules of the individual
state. Id. § 1.01 cmt. c.
14. See generally OKIN, supra note 3, at 160-67.
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It is my hope that this attempt to debunk mother myths will con-
tribute to the ultimate adoption of a partnership model of marriage
that casts married mothers, not as impossible characters of fable,
but rather as equal partners in the fundamentally valuable but ex-
ceedingly risky work of raising children.
I. MOTHERING JUST HAPPENS
The coolest mom I know who's not mine is Connor's.
She plays soccer with him all the time. Idon't think
she has a job. She cooks."5
A. Invisible Mothers
When I was a child, evidence of my mother's labor was every-
where: underwear in drawers, milk in the refrigerator, dinner on the
table, and sometimes when I came home from school oatmeal crisps
made with real butter. Yet it never occurred to me that any of these
things required much effort or time. These were simply my entitle-
ments, dependably appearing, of mysterious and unimportant origin.
Underwear in drawers just happened.
Like other Higher Beings,'" mothers are invisible in the ordinary
course of life.' v In the private sphere where mothers work, no one
watches. Daily details of mothering are largely unnoticed, drawing
attention (and alarm) only when their absence becomes neglect. In a
strange irony, neglectful mothers are visible; conscientious ones are
not.'" As Ann Crittenden observes, the "more skillful the caregiver,
the more invisible her efforts become. Ideally, the recipients them-
selves don't even notice that they are being cared for. ... ""
15. Amy Finnerty, A Stay-At-Home Mom, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1998, at 81 (quoting
a six-year-old interviewee). A middle-class eight-year-old may view a stay-at-home mom
as the "ultimate trophy." Id. An at-home mom confirms her children's perspective that
"they are, in fact, the center of the universe." Id. Not surprisingly, children ranked Mom's
job as 14 on a 15-point scale of importance (quoting a Westinghouse study). Id.
16. Mothers are sometimes thought to be transcendental. As Thackeray observed,
"Mother is the name for God in the lips and hearts of little children." WILLIAM MAKEPEACE
THACKERAY, VANITY FAIR 478 (Oxford Univ. Press 1983) (1847).
17. ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD 72 (Metropolitan Books 2001).
18. Id.
19. See id.; see also Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony, and the Rehabilitation
of Family Care, 71 N.C. L. REv. 721, 776 (1993) (noting that "even within the family...
caregiving is largely invisible").
Mothers themselves reinforce the myth that mothering just happens. Consider the
case of Harriet Beecher Stowe, who confessed to being "constantly pursued and haunted
by the idea that I don't do anything." CRITTENDEN, supra note 17, at 53 (citing JEANNE
BOYDSTON, HOME AND WORK: HOUSEWORK, WAGES, AND THE IDEOLOGY OF LABOR IN THE
EARLY REPUBLIC 162-63 (1990)). And yet in the previous year (1849), Stowe "made two
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If mothers received payment for their work, their efforts might
be more visible. Babysitters, nurses, housekeepers, launderers, cooks,
seamstresses, and painters all earn paychecks in the marketplace,
yet when they perform similar labors in their homes they are con-
sidered unemployed.2 ° The invisibility of mothering thus seems to
stem not from the nature of the work itself, but rather from the fact
that mothers are doing it. 2 The disproportionate attention paid to
fathers who perform caretaking tasks underscores the fact that
gender plays a critical role in visibility.2
At its most extreme the myth that mothering just happens
accounts for the popular, if peculiar, myth that full-time mothers are
extinct, or almost extinct - swiftly disappearing relics of the Betty
Crocker era.23 According to myth, in today's egalitarian, gender-neutral
culture mothers and fathers co-parent, both working full-time in the
paid economy and sharing equally in their leisure time the few family
tasks that are really necessary.24 Accordingly, museum commentary
references the "disappearance of full-time homemakers,"2 and the
popular press trumpets the demise of the traditional family.26
sofas, a chair, diverse bedspreads, pillowcases, pillows, bolsters, and mattresses;
painted rooms; revarnished furniture; [gave] birth to her eighth child; [and ran] a huge
household...." CRIrTENDEN, supra note 17, at 53.
20. Katharine Silbaugh has urged more serious consideration of the economics of
home labor. See Katharine Silbaugh, Cornmodification and Women's Household Labor,
9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 81, 83 (1997).
21. See id. at 82 (discussing whether housework is "viewed as a commodity is con-
textual, not activity-based").
22. As Justice Bird observed, a decision maker may glorify a father because he "often
prepared the child's breakfast and dinner and picked her up from the day care center
himself [though it] is difficult to imagine a mother's performance of these chores even
attracting notice, much less commendable comment." Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486,
495-96 n.6 (Cal. 1986) (Bird, C.J., concurring). Justice Bird further noted that, this
double standard is curiously two-edged when it comes to mothers. Even as a mother's
presence in the home is invisible, her absence as she participates in the paid economy
is conspicuous and may be viewed as evidence that she has abandoned her motherly
duties. Fathers, however, are not only very visible in their caretaking efforts but are ex-
pected to invest in the paid economy and are certainly not suspected of having aban-
doned their families when they do so. Id. at 496; see also FINAL REPORT OF THE MICHIGAN
SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON GENDER ISSUES IN THE COURTS, 69 (1989) (reporting
"[s]tereotypes that influence some judges and that disadvantage mothers include" the
view that "[flathers who exhibit any interest in parenting should be granted custody
despite years of primary caretaking by mothers").
23. Cynthia Starnes, Reflections on Betty Crocker, Soccer Mom and Divorce. A Message
from Detergent Manufacturers, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 285, 287 (1997).
24. Id. at 288-89.
25. A particularly poignant example of this rhetoric appeared in New York's Cooper-
Hewitt Exhibit on Mechanical Brides. Next to a 1961 photo on display, museum com-
mentary noted the "disappearance of full-time homemakers." Id. at 287. For a discussion
of this rhetoric see generally id.
26. A New York Times article, for example, touted the fact that the two-working-
parent family has become a fifty-one percent majority of all two-parent families. Tamar
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Yet, empirical studies reveal that large numbers of married
mothers are working full-time in their homes, especially when their
children are young.27 In 2004, 50.7 percent of married women with
children under age one did not participate in the paid labor force,
an increase of 2.9 percent since 1997.28 In fact, although not widely
publicized, the labor force participation of married women with chil-
dren under age one has declined every year since 1998.29 Also in 2004,
43.1 percent of married women with children under age six did not
participate in the paid labor force, an increase over 2003 figures,
30
and 26.9 percent of married women with children between ages six
and seventeen did not participate in the paid labor force.3 The point
is not that full-time mothering is good or bad, wise or unwise, but
only that it is really happening.
Even when a married mother works outside her home she likely
serves as the primary family caretaker, undertaking a dispropor-
tionately large share of household chores. In 2004, adult women in
households with children under age six spent 2.7 hours daily in
primary childcare, as compared with 1.2 hours for men in similar
households. In households with children under age eighteen, the
Lewin, Now a Majority: Families With 2 Parents Who Work, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2000,
at A20. What is surprising is actually the flip side of this figure: in forty-nine percent
of two-parent families, one or both parents do not work outside the home. This latter
figure is actually the more newsworthy because it suggests that our view of two working
parents as the normative family structure has but a tenuous claim to reality.
27. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT CHARAC-
TERISTICS OF FAMILIES IN 2004, tbl. 6 (2005) [hereinafter BLS-2005].
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at tbl. 4. In 1999, only about forty percent of married women with children
under age six worked full-time in the market, twenty percent worked part-time, and
almost forty percent were not employed in the market at all. CRITTENDEN, supra note
17, at 277 n.8 (citing Steve Hipple, Bureau of Labor Statistics). In 1993, the Bureau of
Labor Statistics reported that, while ninety-six percent of fathers worked outside the
home, only sixty-five percent of mothers did so. See Family and Medical Leave Act Poster
and Background Paper, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 141, July 26, 1993, at D-25 (cited
in 44 DRAKE L. REV. 51, 52 n. 4). In 1991, the Bureau of Labor Statistics counted sixteen
million married women who were not in the labor force because they were "keeping
house" (as compared with 415,000 men). BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, 39 EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS, No. 1 at 204, tbl. 35 (1992).
31. BLS-2005, supra note 27, at tbl. 4. In 1999, twenty-nine percent of married women
between ages twenty-five and fifty-four with children under age eighteen worked exclu-
sively in their homes. CRITTENDEN, supra note 17, at 17 (citing an unpublished March
1999 Current Population Survey). Approximately twenty percent of these mothers were
officially classified as "working," although their work was part-time, a category that
includes those "employed for as little as one hour a week," those "merely looking for
paid work," and those who work without compensation for at least five hours a week in
a family business. CRITTENDEN, supra note 17, at 18.
32. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, AMERICAN TIME-USE SURVEY,
TECHNICAL NOTES tbl. 9 (2004). The Bureau's definition of "primary childcare" includes
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comparable figures were 1.8 hours per day (for women) and 0.8 hours
per day (for men).33 When one expands the definition of mothering to
include activities in the home less directly related to children, the dis-
parity between the family workloads of men and women is startling.
David Demo and Alan Acock, for example, report that women con-
tinue to assume seventy to eighty percent of all housework.34
Yet, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the myth
continues that Betty Crocker 35 and Soccer Mom36 have disappeared.
Perhaps, however, this gap between rhetoric and reality is just a
temporary problem that will disappear as older mothers are replaced
by younger ones with more egalitarian views. Surely in this equal-
opportunity, co-parenting, post-Mystique era,37 younger women will
"physical care; playing with children; reading to children; assistance with homework;
attending children's events; taking care of children's health care needs; and dropping off,
picking up, and waiting for children." Id. at tbl. 9. This definition of childcare thus excludes
time spent in activities that benefit children, but that are less directly related to childcare,
such as preparing meals, shopping, cleaning house, and stocking underwear drawers.
33. Id. at tbl. 9; see also Naomi Cahn, The Power of Caretaking, 12 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 177, n.21 (2000) (citing several studies reporting that women spend more
hours in home care than men, including one report that "mothers of pre-school age
children spent 100 hours more per month than men in childcare").
34. David H. Demo & Alan C. Acock, Family Diversity and the Division of Domestic
Labor: How Much Have Things Really Changed?, 42 FAM. REL. 323, 326 (1993); see also
FRANCES K. GOLDSCHEIDER & LINDA J. WAITE, NEW FAMILIES, No FAMILIES?: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN HOME 111 (1991) (reporting that in households
where both spouses work outside the home, "employed wives seem simply to add the
demands of a job to their traditional responsibilities of running a household"); ARLIE
HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT 8 (1989) (citing a study in which husbands performed
half of household work in only twenty percent of dual-earner families; none of the hus-
bands studied did more); Silbaugh, supra note 9, at 10 (observing that women spend
more than half their working hours on housework while men spend less than one-fourth
of their working hours on housework); see also Ira Mark Ellman, Divorce Rates, Marriage
Rates and the Problematic Persistence of Traditional Marital Roles, 34 FAM. L.Q. 1
(2000); Steven Nock, Time and Gender in Marriage, 86 VA. L. REv. 1971 (2000).
35. "Betty Crocker" is used here to refer to a full-time homemaker. See infra note 37.
36. "Soccer Mom" is used here to refer to a primary homemaker who also works in
the paid economy, either part-time or full-time. The term "soccer mom" was coined by
Susan Casey in her 1995 campaign for Denver City Council. See Christopher Cox, Original
Soccer Mom Spurs Kick, BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 24, 1996, at 1. In Casey's words:
We arrange our lives around our kids and support them . . . I wanted
people to understand that. I've been a teacher, I have a Ph.D., I've managed
national presidential campaigns, but when I wake up in the morning and
when I go to bed at night, my heart and soul are in my family.
Id.
37. Over forty years have passed since The Feminine Mystique challenged the norm
of homemaking as feminine destiny. See generally BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE
MYSTIQUE (1962). When The Feminine Mystique was published in 1962, it sparked a
revolution against Betty Crocker, the full-time homemaker, who according to 1950s
rhetoric, represented women's sole opportunity for happiness. Such illusions about
feminine destiny, argued Friedan, cause women to abandon their dreams, forfeit their
selves and generally fall victim to the "housewife's trap." Id. at 338. The revolution
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not make the same decisions about mothering as their mothers. Or
will they? According to some reports, younger mothers are increas-
ingly choosing full-time homemaking,' and in this post-September- 11
era, with its renewed longing for the comforts of hearth and home, 9
Betty Crocker and Soccer Mom may well become an even more daily
reality. Such a possibility would help explain the peculiar popularity
of pastel and fire-engine red KitchenAid Mixers, new millennial ren-
ditions of a homemaking favorite from an era supposedly long gone.4"
B. The Law of The Invisible Mother
The law of divorce too often assumes mothering just happens.
Under this view:
care of the house and children can be done with one hand tied
behind the back. Send the kids out to school, put them to bed,
and the rest of the time free to play tennis and bridge.41
As one court observed, in justifying short-term alimony to a full-time
mother of three minor children: "I don't think she would want to sit
around the rest of her life. My God, she will turn into a vegetable if
she did that anyhow."42 Evidently, mothering requires little effort or
time - not enough to interfere with a mother's ability and responsi-
bility to pursue a real job. So myth has it.
against domesticity, however, has not eliminated at-home mothers. See supra notes 27-
31 and accompanying text.
38. A Change of Place, BARRON'S, Mar. 21, 1994, at 34 (citing Bureau of Labor statis-
tics showing that "[a]fter three decades of growth, labor force participation by women
appears to be slowing, with Generation X driving the trend"); see also Lisa Belkin, The
Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 44 (reporting that
middle-class women are increasingly choosing full-time homemaking); Peggy O'Crowley,
More Women are Choosing to Make a Career Out of Raising Their Children, NEWHOUSE
NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 19, 2002, at BI, http://www.newhousenews.com/archive/storylb04
1902.html (reporting that "[flor the first time in 25 years, the seemingly unstoppable
advance of mothers going back to work after having a baby has reversed").
39. See, e.g., David Handelman, In Pensive Times, Comfort Magazines Find an
Audience, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2001, at Cl (noting the post-September-11 success of
magazines with "a reassuring touch ... in some way underpinning a sense of home and
comfort"); see also Patricia Leigh Brown, Losing Her Heart to a Wooded House in the
Prairie Style, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2002, at Gi ("To feel at home. It's an emotional
connection, an intangible tug of the heart.").
40. For a picture of a lavender KitchenAid mixer and an observation on its appeal, see
William L. Hamilton, Seeing the Future in All Its Hues, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.10, 2002, at Fl.
41. Lynn Hecht Schafran, Documenting Gender Bias in the Courts: The Task Force
Approach, 70 JUDICATURE 280, 285 (1987) (describing the view of some New York
legislators).
42. Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 67, 306 N.W.2d 16, 19 (Wis. 1981). For a
discussion of this case, see Estin, supra note 19, at 732.
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As long as their marriages remain intact, many married mothers
are protected from the impact of the law's distorted perceptions of
mothering. For those whose marriages end, however, the consequences
of the myth that mothering just happens can be devastating. Faced
with a judge vested with broad discretion to achieve economic equity,43
mothers who have forgone or significantly limited market partici-
pation to assume primary home responsibilities will face an inevi-
table question: "What have you been doing with all your time?"The
question, of course, is rhetorical, and the answer inescapable: "I've
been doing nothing, really - sitting on the sofa eating bonbons
(while the cooking, the cleaning, the shopping, the laundering, the
tutoring, the grooming, the chauffeuring, the listening, the disciplin-
ing and the stocking of underwear drawers just happened)." The
judicial response is predictable and unequivocal: 'Then shame on you.
You have brought your economic troubles on yourself. "'
The law of the invisible mother supports the complementary
notion that monetizing home work is an inapt, futile endeavor that
threatens to destroy the Higher Being 45 status of mothers.46 If mother-
ing just happens without the intervention of human hands, then
attempting to place a worldly value on it would be inappropriate,
indeed foolish. The implication of such reasoning is clear enough: a
43. See supra note 11.
44. For a discussion of the Excessive Mother (as opposed to the slothful mother) who
has allegedly spent too much time mothering her children, see infra Part III.
45. See THACKERAY, supra note 16.
46. According to commodification critics, because market concepts cannot fully capture
the value in intimate relationships, they threaten to destroy that value. As Margaret
Jane Radin explains, "many kinds of particulars - one's politics, work, religion, family,
love, sexuality, friendships, altruism, experiences, wisdom, moral commitments, charac-
ter, and personal attributes [are] ... integral to the self. To understand any of these as
monetizable... is to do violence to our deepest understanding of what it is to be human."
Margaret Jane Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1905-06 (1987).
Simply put, commodification skeptics believe "talk matters: you can pervert the personal-
ness of something by talking about it as if it were fungible." Silbaugh, supra note 20, at
85-86.
Katharine Silbaugh powerfully critiques this notion, arguing that it is actually the
refusal to monetize mothers' domestic chores, rather than such monetization, that
threatens to diminish mothering. Id. As Silbaugh explains, an activity may have '"plural
meanings:' multiple understandings of a single activity that can co-exist." Id. at 96-100.
Commodification anxiety, concludes Silbaugh, 'protects" women by leaving them "without
cash in the name of non-commodification." Id. at 95. Vicki Schultz, however, worries that
while "[n]o self-respecting feminist could be against valuing housework,"' this process
might "encourage women to concentrate on housework and child care at the expense of
a deep commitment to paid work." Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881,
1900-11 (2000).
For a reference on the commodification debate, see generally RETHINKING COMMODI-
FICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C.
Williams eds., 2005).
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divorcing mother who has contributed no real value to marriage has
earned no right to share in any economic fruits of marriage. 7
C. The ALI Response
Hope for a more realistic view of the reality of mothering comes
from the American Law Institute (ALl). In its PRINCIPLES, the ALI
bravely confronts the myth that mothering just happens:
[D]espite the dramatic changes in the workforce participation of
married women over the last several decades, marital roles have
persisted and their impact on the work experiences of married
women remains great. Whether or not women actually leave full-
time employment after the birth of their children, studies consis-
tently show that they usually perform far more than half of the
married couple's domestic chores.4"
As the ALI sees it, mothers are at work in both the market and the
home, caring for children and washing underwear, undertaking re-
sponsibilities disproportionate49 to those of their spouses.
Accordingly, the ALI offers a new alimony model designed espe-
cially for primary caretakers.' Under this model, a presumption arises
that a spouse's disparately low earning capacity (in relation to the
other spouse) is the result of service as the family's primary care-
taker.5 A mother is thus presumptively entitled to alimony if her
earning capacity is substantially less than that of her husband. This
scheme turns the myth that mothering just happens on its head,
47. Many states list the contribution of a homemaker to the acquisition of assets as
a factor for the court to consider as it attempts to equitably distribute marital property
and determine the appropriate amount and duration of any alimony award. See IRA
MARK ELuAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 287-88 (4th ed. 2004).
48. PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 5.05 reporter's notes cmt. d. (emphasis added,
citations omitted).
49. Id. § 5.05 reporter's notes cmt. c.
50. Id. §5.05 (1) and (2).
51. Id. §5.05 (2) provides:
Entitlement to an award under this section should be determined by a rule
of statewide application under which a presumption of entitlement arises
at the dissolution of a marriage in which
(a) there are or have been marital children, or children of either spouse;
(b) while under the age of majority the children have lived with the claimant
(or with both spouses, when the claim is against the stepparent of the
children), for a minimum period specified in the rule; and
(c) the claimant's earning capacity at dissolution is substantially less than
that of the other spouse.
Id. The PRINCIPLES'alimony model is again discussed at infra notes 98-107 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of the market costs of mothering, see infra Part II.A.
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presuming that mothering does happen and leaving it to a higher-
income spouse to prove otherwise. 2 While the ALI's reconceptual-
ized alimony scheme raises other more problematic issues," its frank
recognition of the reality of family caretaking is encouraging.
Although the ALI seems eager to recognize the reality of quasi-
traditional marriages, it is oddly reluctant to recognize the continu-
ing reality of traditional marriages.'M The ALI, for example, contrasts
"the historical pattern in which wives were financially dependent
upon their husbands"55 with "the more usual modern arrangement
in which both spouses are employed outside the home."5 While the
ALI acknowledges that family responsibilities often precipitate gaps
in women's employment,57 such gaps are cast as aberrations from
more ordinary work patterns. Some of the ALI's language seems to
discount the reality of full-time mothers altogether. "In the late
20th century... universal adult labor force participation is both the
empirical norm and the norm generally assumed .... .""
What about the 50.7 percent of married women with children
under age one who did not work outside their homes in 2004, the 43
percent with children under age six who did not work outside their
homes, and the 26.9 percent with children between ages six and
seventeen who did not work outside their homes?5" These at-home
mothers will no doubt be surprised to discover that they lie outside
the generally assumed norm.
Notwithstanding its disappointing treatment of traditional mar-
riages, the ALI's partial success in slaying the myth that mothering
just happens is a step forward. Until fully slain, however, the myth
52. PRINCIPLES §5.05 (3) provides:
A presumption of entitlement governs in the absence of a determination by
the trial court that the claimant did not provide substantially more than
half of the total care that both spouses together provided for the children.
53. Id. Unfortunately, the ALI's choice of a loss-based model rather than a contri-
bution model for alimony unnecessarily casts mothers as victims rather than partners
and sends a dispiriting message about the status of married mothers. For a critique of
the ALI's theoretical model for alimony, see Cynthia Lee Starnes, Mothers as Suckers:
Pity, Partnership, and Divorce Discourse, 90 IOWAL. REv. 1513, 1527-34 (2005) [herein-
after Mothers as Suckers].
54. PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 5.04 cmt. c.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. The term "gappers" refers to women who have taken at least one break from work
of six months or longer after attaining their last educational degree. Joyce Jacobsen &
Laurence Levin, The Effects of Intermittent Labor Force Attachment on Female Earnings,
18MONTHLY LAB. REV., 14, 15 (Sept. 1995). Gappers include women who drop out of the
market for reasons other than family responsibilities, including layoffs, ill health, or
migration. Id. at 16.
58. PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 3.03 cmt. d.
59. BLS-2005, supra note 27, at tbl. 4.
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will continue to cast mothers, especially at-home mothers, as lazy, in-
ferior characters who may generate pity, but who deserve neither
respect nor economic entitlements at divorce. The myth that mother-
ing just happens will also deter legal actors from inquiring into the
market consequences of mothering, thus contributing to the com-
plementary myth that mothering is free.
II. MOTHERING IS FREE
[A]ny woman - no matter her age or lack of
training - can find a nice little job and a nice
little apartment and conduct her later years as she
might have done at age 25.60
A. The Cost-Free Mother
If mothering just happens, it must also be free. As a child, I never
considered that mothering imposed costs. By doing the laundry, the
shopping, the cooking, and the cleaning, my mother invested time
and energy that limited her opportunity to do other things. I am sure
I never once considered the possibility that in the time my mother
spent monitoring and laundering my underwear she could have been
reading a book or investing creative energy at the office. If mothering
was costly my mother never told me. I thought mothering was free.
According to myth, mothering imposes no market costs on women.
It is, rather, a spare-time activity that barely detracts from a woman's
participation in the paid economy. Mothering thus precipitates no
loss in human capital and leaves mothers and fathers in the same eco-
nomic position at divorce. Indeed, to view mothers as economically
disadvantaged by mothering is insulting to women. So myth has it.
The truth, however, is that mothering is not free. It exacts a
significant price from mothers in the form of lost market opportuni-
ties. Simply put, time spent laboring in the home is time not spent
laboring in the market, and as mothers limit their investment in a
job or career, their ability to generate income decreases. Ultimately,
mothers lose some opportunities altogether. The realities of de-
preciating human capital impact many types of mothers: full time
housewives, who forgo market employment altogether; gappers,
who periodically drop out of the job market; and the many primary
homemakers, who continually compromise their market engage-
ment to assume a major portion of family responsibilities.
60. Schafran, supra note 41, at 285 (quoting a New York legislator's description of
distorted judicial perspectives).
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Empirical studies confirm that mothers do indeed pay a market
price for their work in the home."' Recent data suggest that the long-
reported wage gap between income-earning men and women is more
closely linked to mothering than to gender alone." Indeed, when one
compares the incomes of childless men and women, the wage gap
narrows considerably. Diana Furchtgott-Roth and Christine Stolba
found that in 1993, childless women (age twenty-seven to thirty-
three) earned ninety-eight percent as much as childless men in the
same age group. 3 This finding is consistent with the much-cited
work of Victor Fuchs, who reported that the hourly wages of women,
but not men, decline proportionately with the number of children in
the household.64
The costs of mothering are most evident in the case of displaced
homemakers, long-term Betty Crockers who have spent their most
career-productive years in the home rather than the market.65 Evi-
dence of the financial vulnerability of these women is unmistakable,
largely because their opportunity costs have been actualized and thus
are easily demonstrable.66 If their marriages end, these women cannot
simply return to the marketplace armed with a r6sume listing "mom
as previous work experience and easily compete with workers twenty
years younger. Time lost in the home cannot often be reclaimed when
the home is lost. For the full-time homemaker of many years, divorce
ruthlessly shatters any pretense that mothers can recapture years
spent washing underwear.
Even temporary withdrawals from paid employment to care for
children can impact earning capacity, perhaps indefinitely. Joyce
Jacobsen and Laurence Levin report that "women whose labor force
gap occurred more than 20 years ago still earn between 5 percent
and 7 percent less than women who never left the labor force and
have comparable levels of experience.""
61. See generally CRITTENDEN, supra note 17.
62. See generally Mothers as Suckers, supra note 53.
63. DIANA FURCHTGOTT-ROTH & CHRISTINE STOLBA, WOMEN'S FIGURES: THE ECONOMIC
PROGRESS OF WOMEN IN AMERICA 8 (1996). According to Columbia professor Jane
Waldfogel, "the family gap between women with children and women without children
has been rising in recent years, even as the gender gap between women and men has
been narrowing." Jane Waldfogel, Understanding the 'Tamily Gap" in Pay for Women
with Children, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 137, 143 (1998).
64. VICTOR FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 61-62 (1988). For
women, concludes Fuchs, "the greatest barrier to economic equality is children." Id. at
147; see also Waldfogel, supra note 63, at 153 (stating that Fuch's observation "is at
least as true today as it was a decade ago").
65. See generally Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse
on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U.
CHI. L. REV. 67 (1993) [hereinafter Displaced Homemaker].
66. See generally id.
67. Jacobsen & Levin, supra note 57, at 18. The researchers' hypothetical case of a
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Easiest to ignore are the market costs incurred by primary home-
makers, typically mothers, who combine market employment with
a second shift as primary family caretaker."8 These mothers often
work part-time or part-year, but even those who work full-time, year-
round, are likely to limit their market investment to perform primary
caretaking responsibilities. 9 As Congress recognized in the Family
and Medical Leave Act, a caretaker's home responsibilities often limit
her career choice and advancement.7" Indeed, many women "choose
work that will fit around... their family responsibilities, a complica-
tion and impediment to occupational advancement not faced by most
men."'" As Jerry Jacobs and Kathleen Gerson observe, a primary inci-
dent of motherhood is reduced working time.72 From an employer's per-
spective, a primary homemaker is simply not an "ideal worker."73
Whether she is a full-time homemaker, a gapper, or a primary
homemaker, a mother's efforts in the home are likely to reduce her
earnings in the paid economy. Unfortunately, the law seems loath to
acknowledge this reality.
B. The Law of the Cost-Free Mother
No-fault divorce laws invite judges to entertain the myth that
mothering is free. This invitation is fundamentally grounded in the
underlying philosophy of no-fault divorce. The basic scheme of no-
fault is to allow easy access to divorce without a showing of fault74 and
sometimes at the will of only one spouse.75 The law has abandoned
woman who dropped out of the paid labor force from age twenty-five to age thirty-two
illustrates the impact of these figures. Id. This woman's seven-year gap in employment
cost her ten years of earnings. Id.
68. See generally HOCHSCHILD, supra note 34.
69. See Demo and Acock, supra note 34, at 325-26.
70. See Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5) (1996).
71. BUREAU OFTHE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'TOFCOM., WOMENINTHEAMERICAN ECONOMY,
SERIES P-23, No. 146, at 7 (1986).
72. JERRY A. JACOBS & KATHLEEN GERSON, THE TIME DIVIDE: WORK, FAMILY, AND
GENDER INEQUALITY 111 (2004). These researchers note, for example, that working
women are more likely than working men to stay home when child-care arrangements
fail or when a child is sick. Id. at 90. Ann Crittenden cites a 1996 study in which married
mothers who worked outside their homes averaged 1,197 hours in paid employment, as
compared with 2,132 hours for married fathers. CRITTENDEN, supra note 17, at 18 (citing
Deborah Fallows in a 1996 panel discussion at the Harvard/Radcliffe twenty-fifth reunion).
73. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER 1 (2000) (describing a gender-based
system of "domesticity," consisting of an ideal worker "who works full time and overtime
and takes little or no time off for childbearing or child rearing" and a marginalized care-
giver who supports his ideal worker status).
74. The specific grounds for a fault-based divorce vary by state. Typical grounds are
adultery, desertion, and cruelty. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 47, at 207.
75. Although rarely acknowledged in no-fault statutes, most no-fault divorce laws
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old notions of divorce as a remedy for a wronged spouse in favor of the
more pragmatic, less moralistic notion that divorce is merely legal
recognition that a marriage has died, if not of its own volition, then
at least without any identified fault by either party.76 Free of blame,
each spouse is thus entitled to begin life anew, free of the shackles
of a dead relationship. To the extent these shackles include eco-
nomic entanglements, then those too must be severed. Just as neither
spouse is responsible for failure of the marriage, neither is responsible
for the other's financial situation. Each spouse deserves a fresh start,
a clean break that severs both the parties' legal status and their
financial rights and responsibilities. So the no-fault storyline reads.
In practical terms, this clean-break principle encourages judges
in our hugely discretionary regime77 to settle all equities between the
spouses through a one-time division of property and to deny or se-
verely limit alimony.78 If alimony is unavoidable,79 it should be limited
to the smallest amount necessary for a spouse's retraining, i.e., for
rehabilitation to enable the damaged spouse to begin a new life as
a productive citizen this time around.' More extensive alimony would
effectively authorize divorce at the will of one spouse. See id. at 222 (noting that "while
the law in the books does not recognize unilateral divorce, in most states the law in
action does").
76. No-fault statutes come in two types: "marital breakdown standards" and living
"separate and apart" standards. Id. at 219.
77. See supra text accompanying note 11. For a discussion of the discretionary
nature of property division and alimony, see Displaced Homemaker, supra note 65, at
92-95, 101-06.
78. As the Official Comment to the UMDA § 308 explains:
The dual intention of this section and Section 307 [on property division] is
to encourage the court to provide for the financial needs of the spouses by
property disposition rather than by an award of maintenance. Only if the
available property is insufficient for the purpose and if the spouse who
seeks maintenance is unable to secure employment appropriate to his skills
and interests or is occupied with child care may an award of maintenance
be ordered.
UMDA, supra note 11, § 308, Official Comment.
Even under fault-based divorce laws, parties usually received a clean break, as evi-
denced by the surprisingly small number of cases in which alimony was ordered. In
1990, the Census Bureau reported that 16.8 percent of the 19.3 million ever-divorced and
currently separated women (as of 1987) were entitled to receive alimony under a divorce
decree. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT OF COM., CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS -
CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1987, SERIES P-23, No. 167 at 11 (1990). Curious then is
the comment in the UMDA Prefatory Note that "the Act does not continue the traditional
reliance upon maintenance as the primary means of support for divorced spouses." UMDA,
supra note 11, at Prefatory Note.
79. The level of need required to qualify a claimant for alimony is unclear. "Need"
has no precise definition and could conceivably be tested against a variety of compar-
ative baselines, including the federal poverty level or, more generously, against the
standard of living during marriage. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 47, at 380-82.
80. See, e.g., UMDA, supra note 11, § 308(b). The word "rehabilitation" suggests a
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inappropriately and unnecessarily prolong the economic agony of a
dead marriage and send a negative message about women's depen-
dency on men."' If the critical alimony question is thus "how much
time will it take to repair an economically needy mother?" Myth
supplies an easy answer: "very little, since mothering is free."
The clean-break principle and its supporting mother myth pose
significant danger for real mothers. Most obviously, judges are
tempted to overlook disparate economic positioning resulting from
marital roles and to ignore the reality that a mother who has worked
exclusively or primarily in her home during marriage is not likely
to be the market equal of her husband who has more fully invested
in paid employment.82 If disparate positioning really exists it spoils
everything. If the parties do not own much property, a common fact
pattern,8 3 then a court can not achieve equity by awarding the lower
income spouse a larger share of marital property. In such cases,
clean-break principles conflict with principles of equity. Pretending
that homemaking has not imposed market costs avoids this conflict.
It is easier to deny the costs of mothering than to reconcile income
disparities with clean-break principles. It is easier to insist that if
income disparity exists, it is the product of a mother's poor work
blame-the-victim perspective, as if mothers are criminals in need of rescue from their
lives of vice. For a discussion of the expectation of rehabilitation as a limitation on the
duration of alimony, see ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 47, at 400-01.
81. Some participants in the women's movement of the 1960s and 1970s took the
position that women, as the equals of men, do not need the financial support of their ex-
husbands. See BETrY FRIEDAN, IT CHANGED MY LIFE 325-26 (1976).
The women's movement had just begun when the so-called divorce reform
law was passed. At that time, we were so concerned with principle - that
equality of right and opportunity had to mean equality of responsibility,
and therefore alimony was out - that we did not realize the trap we were
falling into.
See also Susan Westerberg Prager, Shifting Perspectives on Marital Property Law, in
RETHiNKING THE FAMILY: SOME FEMINIST QUESTIONS 111, 123 (Barrie Thorne & Marilyn
Yalom eds., 1982) (noting that California feminists failed to see the economic effects of
no-fault divorce on women); Martha L. Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology,
Contradiction and Social Change: A Study of Rhetoric and Results in the Regulation of
the Consequences of Divorce, 1983 WIS. L. REv. 789, 853-85 (observing that Wisconsin
reformers mistakenly believed that injustice could be avoided by treating marriage as
a partnership of equals and equally dividing marital property). But see SUSAN FALUDI,
BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN 20 (1991) (arguing that
feminists had virtually no involvement with divorce-law reform).
82. See Jacobsen & Levin, supra note 57.
83. See Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York's
Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621, 662-63 (1991)
(indicating divorcing couples in New York usually had less than $25,000 in divisible
assets); Ilene E. Shapiro & Barry P. Schatz, Has the Illinois Equitable Distribution
Statute Advanced the Cause of the Homemaker?, 1986 ILL. B.J. 492, 500 (noting that
"most estates are too small to support anyone").
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ethic or intellect or of society's bias. A mother's predicament is thus
her fault or society's fault and therefore appropriately ignored at
divorce. Certainly it is not a husband's responsibility, for we are clear
on the point that mothering is free.
Indeed, the history of no-fault divorce law is a sad tale of denial
of the costs of mothering. Most distressing is the case of the full-
time homemaker whose marriage ends after many years of care-
taking. Early no-fault courts often seemed unaware of the costs of
mothering even for these women. Seduced by egalitarian visions of
housewives retrained and entering the job market, too many courts
abruptly freed long-term homemakers to begin new lives - with
limited property, little if any support, and years of absence from the
job market.' For these Betty Crockers, divorce occasioned a sea
change, not only in status but in economics, as they lost the family
wage and often the family home."5 At worst, a long-term caregiver
was treated as a "breeding cow to be nurtured during her years of
fecundity, then conveniently and economically converted to cheap
steaks when past her prime."86 Concerned commentators cried foul,
task forces were launched to explore the possibility of gender bias
in the courts," and a myriad of divorce reform proposals were promul-
gated to deal more fairly with displaced homemakers.8 8 Task forces
partly attributed divorce inequities to gender bias in the courts, s
and surely this is a factor, but a fuller explanation lies in the myth
that mothering is free.
84. See Displaced Homemaker, supra note 65, at 78-85.
85. See id. at 85-96.
86. In re Marriage of Branter, 136 Cal. Rptr. 635, 637 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
87. For a general description of gender bias in the courts, see ABAISSUES HANDBOOK
(Jan. 2002) ("Gender bias in the courtroom generally takes three forms: stereotyping
the nature and roles of women and men; devaluing women and what is perceived as
women's work; and acting on myths and misconceptions about the social and economic
realities of women's and men's lives."). See generally Isabel Marcus, Reflections on the
Significance of the Sex/Gender System: Divorce Law Reform in New York, 42 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 55 (1987); Schafran, supra note 41.
88. See, e.g., OKIN, supra note 3, at 182-83; June Carbone, Income Sharing: Redefining
the Family in Terms of Community, 31 Hous. L. REV. 359 (1994); Displaced Homemaker,
supra note 65; Martha Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing
Women's Work Through Premarital Security Agreements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17 (1998); Estin,
supra note 19; Joan M. Krauskopf, Comments on Income Sharing: Redefining the Family
in Terms of Community, 31 Hous. L. REV. 417 (1994); Jane Rutherford, Duty in Divorce:
Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 539 (1990); Jana B. Singer,
Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103 (1989).
89. See, e.g., MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON GENDER ISSUES IN THE
COURTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 8 (1989) (finding that "resolution of
economic issues is often premised on misconceptions about the economic consequences
of divorce for women").
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Some commentators claim the law is moving toward a more
realistic and more humane treatment of displaced homemakers.9 °
Hopefully they are right. However, the continuing vitality of the
clean-break philosophy suggests that no-fault divorce laws have not
altogether escaped their history. Indeed, even as the law may be
moving toward more realistic views of the cost of mothering for
long-term homemakers, it appears stubbornly resistant to evidence
that primary homemakers, who combine market and family work,
also experience market costs.9 A primary homemaker's market par-
ticipation may be exaggerated and her home efforts minimized in
order to create the illusion of a fully egalitarian marriage that facili-
tates conscience-free application of the clean-break principle. Yet even
after divorce this younger mother's market losses will continue to
accrue as she undertakes primary caretaking responsibilities,92 often
with less help from her children's father than while their marriage
was intact. While such a mother may benefit incidentally from child
support, such support will not compensate her for the depreciation
in human capital caused by market disinvestment.93 Child support,
by definition, aims to provide for children and not for the mother who
cares for them.94
The temptation to ignore the costs of mothering, especially in the
case of younger mothers, is made more compelling by the law's tradi-
tional reluctance to recognize lost opportunities as compensable losses.
Although contracting parties understand the reality of lost opportu-
nities, the law traditionally has viewed them as too speculative to
warrant recovery because it generally does not award damages for
the lost opportunity to have contracted with a more reliable partner
or to have entered into a more lucrative contract.95 A mother's claim
90. These claims reach at least as far back as Joan Krauskopfs 1988 observation of
an appellate trend "to preserve indefinite alimony by curbing the excesses of rehabili-
tative alimony." Joan M. Krauskopf, Rehabilitative Alimony: Uses and Abuses of Limited
Duration Alimony, 21 FAM. L.Q. 573, 573 (1988).
91. See generally Estin, supra note 19.
92. See WILLIAMS, supra note 73, at 126. In close to ninety percent of divorces, mothers
obtain primary physical custody of children. ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 47, at 571.
93. See Displaced Homemaker, supra note 65, at 79-80.
94. As one court explained in addressing the case of a nonmarital child: "to raise [the
mother's] standard of living through the vehicle of child support would constitute the im-
position of an unauthorized obligation on part of the father toward the mother." State v.
Hall, 418 N.W.2d 187, 190 (Minn. App. 1988) (quoting Kathy G.J. Arnold D., 501 N.Y.S.2d
58, 64 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)).
95. As Allan Farnsworth explains,
[I]t is important to understand that the law has not generally recognized
yet another kind of reliance - reliance that consists in forgoing opportu-
nities to make other contracts. In the example given, the builder may have
passed up another job, and the owner may have passed up the possibility
of hiring another builder in reliance on their contract. But the difficulties
of proving this are obvious, and courts have not been receptive to claims
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that she lost market opportunities because of mothering may trigger
this traditional response, for until her childcare years end, her depre-
ciated human capital will be partly or fully hypothetical and there-
fore easy to deny. Even when a mother's depreciated human capital is
evident, determining the extent of that depreciation will be difficult
or impossible, for rarely will there be a comparative baseline against
which to measure a mother's best alternative opportunity, i.e., what
she would have become but for mothering.9" Primary homemakers
may indeed be "just a man away from poverty"97 but because they are
not yet in poverty, it is easy to pretend that mothering is free.
C. The ALI Response
The ALI's success as a myth slayer lies primarily in its candid
recognition of the costs of primary caretaking. These costs are "both
significant and common," says the ALI, and "cannot be ignored by the
law."9" The ALI frankly acknowledges that "women's relative wage
declines in nearly a straight line with the number of children in the
household."' Moreover, "the birth of children usually affects the earn-
ing capacity of women who continue to work full time as well as those
who do not."'' ° As the ALI observes:
Economic studies demonstrate that responsibility for the care of
children ordinarily has a significant continuing impact on parental
earning capacity. This effect is not limited to parents who withdraw
from full-time employment, but occurs also among primary care-
takers who continue full-time market labor. 101
based on this kind of reliance.
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.1 (4th ed. 2004).
96. For discussion of such a lost-opportunity model, see Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory
of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 3, 40-48 (1989).
97. NATIONAL DISPLACED HOMEMAKERS NETWORK, THE MORE THINGS CHANGE... A
STATUS REPORT ON DISPLACED HOMEMAKERS AND SINGLE PARENTS IN THE 1980S 60
(1990). Middle-class women are especially vulnerable to divorce laws. For low-income
women divorce perpetuates, but does not initiate, poverty. For upper-class women,
property is often significant, so that even half of the marital property will sustain a
comfortable standard of living. For middle-income homemakers, however, property may
be scant and income-earning ability compromised by primary caretaking responsi-
bilities. As Herma Hill Kay observed, "marriage, it seems, is both a long-term cause and
a short-term cure of female poverty." Herma Hill Kay, Beyond No-fault: New Directions
in Divorce Reform, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 30 (Steven D. Sugarman
& Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990).
98. PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 5.05 cmt. d. "[W]ives continue, in the great majority
of cases," adds the ALI, "to sacrifice earnings opportunities to care for their children..
Id. § 5.05 reporter's notes cmt. c. (emphasis added).
99. Id. § 5.05 reporter's notes cmt. d.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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The ALI's answer to a mother's disparate financial positioning
at divorce is to craft a new alimony scheme in which a presumption
of entitlement arises if: (1) children lived with the claimant for a
minimum specified period and (2) a claimant's earning capacity is
"substantially less" than that of her spouse.1"2 Under this scheme,
"the inference that child-care responsibilities adversely affected the
claimant's earning capacity is not rebuttable,"10 3 largely because
although the link between care of children and earning capacity loss
can be established generally,
it is often difficult to show in the particular case. And even where
the fact of loss may be clear enough, its size often cannot be estab-
lished because of the speculation inherent in comparing the actual
facts with the hypothetical facts that would have developed had
the parties behaved differently years earlier.0 4
The ALI's rationale for its primary-caretaker alimony scheme lies
in the proposition that a mother should not bear the entire financial
cost of her role since "the cost of raising the couple's children is their
joint responsibility."'10 5
Although it casts alimony as an entitlement to loss-sharing, the
ALI makes alimony modifiable upon changed circumstances. Among
these circumstances is a recipient's remarriage, 06 which the ALI sees
as "the divorced woman['s] ... surest path to financial recovery.' '1O7
Something disturbing, if not familiar, lies in the suggestion that a
woman's financial future depends on her ability to find a replace-
ment male provider.' Mothers are not fungible underwear washers
102. Id. § 5.05(2). For the full text of this section, see supra note 51.
103. PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 5.05 cmt. d.
104. Id.
105. Id. § 5.05 cmt. a.
106. PRINCIPLES § 5.07 provides in pertinent part:
An obligation to make periodic payments.., ends automatically at the
remarriage of the obligee... without regard to the award's term as fixed
in the decree, unless either (1) the original decree provides otherwise, or
(2) the court makes written findings... establishing that termination of
the award would work a substantial injustice because of facts not present
in most cases ....
Awards under Topic 3 of the PRINCIPLES, which are based on reimbursement or rescission
and relate to only a few marriages, do not terminate on remarriage. Id. § 5.14(3).
107. Id. § 5.07 reporter's notes cmt. c.
108. For a critique of the remarriage-termination rule generally, see Cynthia Lee
Starnes, One More Time: Intuition, Alimony, and the Remarriage-Termination Rule, 81
IND. L.J. 971 (2006). The legitimacy of the near-universal rule that alimony terminates
automatically or presumptively upon a recipient's remarriage has a huge impact on ali-
mony recipients since approximately seventy-five percent of divorcing women remarry
within ten years, and fifty-four percent remarry within five years. DEP'TOF HEALTHAND
HUMAN SERVS., COHABITATION, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND REMARRIAGE IN THE U.S., VITAL
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in need of male support - any male will do. While the ALI thus
strikes a powerful blow to the myth that mothering is free and offers
a compelling solution to the real cost of mothering, its willingness
to abandon mothers to a Cinderella future is disappointing. Even
more disappointing is the ALI's reluctance to seriously challenge
the myth that mothering is for babies.
III. MOTHERING IS FOR BABIES 10 9
Now that I have them, they shan't escape me.
- Wicked Witch in Hansel and Gretel"
A. The Excessive Mother
Fundamentally we know The Excessive Mother exists. Take, as
her extreme example, the wicked witch in Hansel and Gretel, "' who
was an Excessive Cookie Baker indeed, having constructed an entire
house of gingerbread, evidently for the very bad purpose of enticing
and consuming children. Such Excessive Mothers are terrible, surely
enough, but wicked witches are generally easy to spot." 2 When, in
the case of more ordinary mother figures, is enough really enough?
When should a mother back off?
AND HEALTH STATISTICS, Ser. 23, Num. 22, 22 (July 2002). Moreover, subsequent mar-
riages do not fully protect mothers from the effects of their depreciated human capital,
since second marriages are at least as likely to fail as first ones. See BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, NUMBER, TIMING, AND
DURATION OF MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES: 1996 3 (2002) (reporting that, based on 1996
data, women who entered second marriages in 1975 through 1984 were less likely to
reach their tenth anniversary than were women entering first marriages during the
same period).
109. While abrogation of the tender years doctrine (see generaUy Exparte Devine, 398
So. 2d 686 (A. 1981)) dispels the notion that babies are for moms, the law has not yet
abandoned the converse notion that moms are for babies.
110. Wicked Witch, upon the approach of Hansel and Gretel. GRIMM'S FAIRY TALES
BY THE BROTHERS GRIMM 330, 337 (E.V. Lucas, Lucy Crane & Marian Edwardes trans.,
1945). As the story goes:
Although the old woman appeared to be so friendly, she was really a wicked
old witch who was on the watch for children, and she had built the bread
house on purpose to lure them to her. Once her gingerbread house accom-
plished its purpose and lured Hansel and Gretel, the wicked witch continued
her mothering: "Ah, dear children, who brought you here? Come in and stay
with me. You shall come to no harm." She took them by the hand and led
them into the little house. A nice dinner was set before them: pancakes and
sugar, milk, apples, and nuts. After this she showed them two little white
beds into which they crept, and they felt as if they were in heaven ....
Id. at 337.
111. Id.
112. "Witches have red eyes and can't see very far, but they have keen noses like
animals and can scent the approach of human beings." Id.
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The initial question must be whether mothering beyond infancy
confers a benefit at all. Surely, as mothering becomes less neces-
sary, it does not necessarily become valueless. As children outgrow
the need for diapers, rational mothers do not persist in diapering
them but direct their mothering efforts elsewhere - into planning
and preparing family meals,113 editing high school English papers,
transporting children to ballet and swimming and soccer practice, rais-
ing money for football helmets, cleaning, laundering, tutoring, baking,
shopping, and stocking underwear drawers. If a mother performed
these labors for an employer no one would question whether the em-
ployer received a benefit. When she performs similar labors for her
family, her actions also confer benefits, regardless of whether they
are actually necessary. The point here is certainly not that mothers
should do these things, but only that doing them confers a benefit." 4
Of course, not all that is beneficial is valuable in the economic
sense. The real concern may not be that post-infancy mothering con-
fers no benefit, but rather that it is inefficient. The question thus be-
comes: at what point on the continuum of a child's life do the costs of
mothering exceed its benefits? When do the inefficiencies of work
directed at an individual family (that does not actually need much
mothering) warrant the conclusion that a mother should focus on
the market instead, i.e., get a job or a job with more hours, and that
her failure to do so must be a product of excessive mothering? Diffi-
cult questions follow: What are the costs (to a mother, to her family,
to society) of mothering or of market engagement in lieu of mother-
ing? What are the benefits (to a mother, to her family, to society) of
mothering or of market engagement in lieu of mothering? What are
the costs and benefits (to a mother, to her family, to society) of a
mother's "balancing" home and market labor in various ratios? Ob-
viously, some answers are easier to quantify than others. Consider
the fictional case of Ms. Weber:
It is a cold night in the middle of the winter of 1987. Sleet
is falling in a thick film and the streets are deserted. Anthony
and Julia walk down Twenty-second Street between First and
113. See generally Marjorie L. DeVault, Doing Housework: Feeding and Family Life,
in FAMILIES AND WORK 178 (Naomi Gerstel & Harriet Engel Gross eds., 1987).
114. One of the most significant teachings of feminism is the value of freedom to
choose - to control one's own body, to hold property, to vote, to pursue an education,
to work in the market. To the extent economic fortune allows, a woman should also be
free to choose to work in her home. Of course, not all mothers who prioritize home-
making have made a voluntary choice to do so. Naomi Cahn has observed "constraints
on women's lives such that they appear to choose a life of household duties and to
conserve power within that sphere, when, in fact, the choice is rigged." Cahn, supra note
33, at 180.
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Second avenues and turn onto the tree-lined block called Gramercy
Park East. Number 120, an old synagogue housing a small shelter
for the homeless...
"I come here with my wife," [Mr. Weber] says, nodding in the
direction of a small, dark woman still engaged in preparing her
belongings for the night. She takes a blue bathrobe from her shop-
ping bag, folds it in her lap, then pulls one out for her husband
and lays it across the pillow, which she fluffs up before turning
down the sheet. Carrying two white towels and a large plastic bag
filled with soaps and creams, she walks out of the room as if she
is alone and busy in her own home, as if there are not a dozen
people seated at tables, many of them watching her intimate
preparations for the night.""
Ms. Weber's acts are small things: fluffing a husband's pillow,
turning down his sheet, laying out his bathrobe. What are the costs
and benefits of such actions? Not much cost evidently because Ms.
Weber's efforts require only a few minutes. Unless, of course, she has
arthritis or passed up work at McDonald's or McGraw Hill or Lehman
Brothers to be there with her husband. As for benefits, Mr. Weber
is hardly a baby; he is not even a child and certainly does not need
anyone to fluff his pillow. Maybe he does not appreciate his wife's
efforts much, having grown accustomed to them. If she had forgone
her attentions this night, would costs have followed? Would Mr. Weber
have been saddened by her absence or her inattentiveness? If there
is not much benefit here, maybe there is still enough to outweigh the
negligible cost.
Market tools fail to capture that even small acts of mothering
can confer great benefit. My Grandma would bring tea in a flowery
china cup to soothe my tummy ache. If Grandma had been at work,
she would not have been there to see my pain. Was she an excessive
Grandma? As a teenager I may have thought so, but even then I was
taking in something from her attentions: you are valuable, this is
how you care for others - little lessons that build on one another
and persist much longer than Grandma's cup of tea. Market analysis
seems an awkward tool with which to value the efforts of mothers,
Grandmas, and Ms. Webers.
One thing seems clear, however, even without the help of market
analysis. When Bobby boards the school bus for the first time, his
mother's mandatory work load declines. But does Bobby's absence
from 9:00 A.M. to 2:00 P.M. necessarily mean his mother should take
a job from 9:30 A.M. to 1:30 P.M.? From 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M.?
What if the physical and emotional stress of being on her feet all
115. Jane Lazarre, Fictions of Home, in REPRESENTATIONS OF MOTHERHOOD, supra
note 9, at 47, 50.
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day or fighting office back-stabbing or appeasing angry clients makes
Bobby's mother less efficient (and less caring) at home? How much
time and energy does it take to mother well, to nurture a child, and
to build a haven from the nastiness outside? Is a minimalist answer
better than a generous one? Is there a one-size-fits-all answer?
If we cannot answer such questions with confidence, maybe we
would be wise to defer to a mother's judgment about how much
mothering is appropriate.' 16 Who can better understand what efforts
will benefit her family and how much time those efforts require? A
mother may be wrong in her assessment, but who has a better shot
at being right? Not Bobby. And not third parties seduced by the
myth that mothering is for babies.
B. The Law of The Excessive Mother
Too often the law, searching for The Excessive Mother, mistakes
"unemployed" mothers of two-year-olds for wicked witches. The story
begins with the normative vision of marriage as an egalitarian, com-
panionate relationship in which both spouses make equal contribu-
tions to the market and the home. From this foundation flows the
natural conclusion that all mothers either are or should be at work
in the market, with perhaps a limited exception for mothers of very
young children.
This understanding of the-way-things-are-supposed-to-be is
dramatically evident in the laws governing imputation of income in
child support cases. In all states, child support is calculated accord-
ing to guidelines which generate a presumptively appropriate amount
of support based on various factors." ' When a residential parent's
income is one of the guideline factors and that parent has limited
her market employment in order to care for children, the law may
impute income to her for purposes of calculating child support.
118
This income imputation effectively reduces the amount of child sup-
port and thus creates an incentive for the unemployed or under-
employed residential parent to find appropriate employment. Of
course, the effect of imputing income to a residential parent who
does not respond by beginning or increasing her market work is
simply to reduce the amount of support available to a child, a result
that is starkly inconsistent with family law's general goal of protect-
ing the best interests of children." 9
116. One should continue to watch out, of course, for the truly terrible mother guilty
of abuse or neglect.
117. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 47, at 459-60.
118. PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 3.15 (1)(a).
119. In most states, for example, custody is determined according to the best interest
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So when do a child's needs allow a residential parent's increased
employment and thus justify income imputation to a mother who is
inappropriately underemployed? Early on, say some states. Defer-
ence to a caretaker's employment decision is appropriate, says Idaho,
only until a child is six months old.20 Two years old, say Alaska'21
and Maryland.122 Two and a half years old, says Colorado.'23 Three
years old, say Kentucky,'24 Maine,'25 and North Carolina.'26 Fiveyears
old, says Louisiana.127 Six years old, say Massachusetts'28 and New
Mexico.' 29
Once a child reaches this identified age, income may be imputed
to "enable" the gainful employment of a mother who has misjudged
of the child. See, e.g., UMDA, supra note 11, § 402 ('The court shall determine custody
in accordance with the best interest of the child."). See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 47,
at 564-65.
120. IDAHO CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES, § 6(c)(1), in IDAHO R. Civ. P. 6(c)(6) (2006)
("Ordinarily, a parent shall not be deemed underemployed if the parent is caring for a
child not more than 6 months of age.").
121. ALASKA R. Civ. 90.3(a)(4) (2006) ("A determination of potential income may not
be made for a parent who is physically or mentally incapacitated, or who is caring for
a child under two years of age to whom the parents owe a joint legal responsibility.").
122. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 12-204(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2004) ("A determination
of potential income may not be made for a parent who... is caring for a child under the
age of 2 years for whom the parents are jointly and severally responsible.").
123. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-115(7)(b)(1) (2004)
If a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, child support shall
be calculated based on a determination of potential income; except that a
determination of potential income shall not be made for a parent who is
physically or mentally incapacitated or is caring for a child under the age of
thirty months for whom the parents owe a joint legal responsibility.
124. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.212(2)(d) (LexisNexis 1999) (noting that "a determi-
nation of potential income shall not be made for a parent who is physically or mentally
incapacitated or is caring for a very young child, age three (3) or younger, for whom the
parents owe a joint legal responsibility").
125. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 2001(5)(D) (1998) ("In the absence of evidence
in the record to the contrary, a party that is personally providing primary care for a
child under the age of 3 years is deemed not available for employment.").
126. N.C. CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES, Income (3), AOC-A-162, Rev. 10/02 at 3(2002).
127. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.11 (A) (2000) ("If a party is voluntarily unemployed
or underemployed, child support shall be calculated based on a determination of his or
her income earning potential, unless the party is physically or mentally incapacitated,
or is caring for a child of the parties under the age of five years.").
128. MASS. PROB. & FAM. CT. R., Child Support Guidelines, Guideline 11 (1996)
If the court makes a determination that either or both parties is earning
substantially less than he or she could through reasonable effort, the court
may consider potential earning capacity rather than actual earnings....
This determination is not intended to apply to a custodial parent with
children who are under the age of six living in the home.
129. N.M. STAT.ANN. § 40-4-11. 1(C)(1) (LexisNexis 1999) (stating that"income' means
actual gross income of a parent if employed to full capacity or potential income if
unemployed or underemployed. Income need not be imputed to the primary custodial
parent actively caring for a child of the parties who is under the age of six or disabled").
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how much mothering is appropriate. Of course not every court will
not impute income to every mother of a child beyond the threshold
age. 30 Still, the law's message is disturbingly clear: after a child
reaches the age of six months, six years, or some age in between, a
judge should assess whether a mother's decision to limit her market
investment in order to mother is warranted in view of her market
opportunities. At worst, a judge begins this cost/benefit appraisal
of a mother's decision with the assumption that if a mother can earn
more, she should earn more, since the law has already disqualified
her from the statutory deference granted mothers of younger children.
The danger to mothers posed by the myth that mothering-is-
for-babies is not limited to child support. The same reasoning that
leads a court to reduce child support in order to coax a mother out of
the home may lead a court to deny or limit alimony toward the same
end."'3 Consider the case of the long-term, full-time homemaker who
has been out of the job market for many years. If mothers should be
working in the paid economy once a child reaches age six months or
six years, how can this homemaker justify the time she spent in full-
time mothering beyond her children's early years? Surely, she must
be an Excessive Mother. Superfluous. Lazy. Self-Indulgent. For some
reason, she has behaved inefficiently, inappropriately, and there-
fore, any market costs that flow from such behavior are her fault
and her responsibility. No long-term alimony for such an Excessive
Mother, who needs a kick in the pants to get her off the sofa and into
real, meaningful labor.
Similar reasoning endangers the younger mother who has com-
promised her market investment to care for children, either by tem-
porarily dropping out of the market, or by working part-time or
seasonally, perhaps in the secondary-job market in order to accom-
modate her caretaking. Unlike the long-term Betty Crocker, this
mother's most potentially productive career years may lie ahead of
her. Ample time for a judge to set her on the path to productive citizen-
ship by encouraging her to become gainfully employed, i.e., by deny-
ing her alimony, or awarding her just enough to allow her education
or retraining. Clearly, an alimony award sufficient to enable her to
persist in excessive mothering would be very bad. The law of alimony,
like the law of child support, thus invites judges to determine how
130. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 3.15 (5) (in exercising its discretion to
impute income to a residential parent whose child is age six or older, "the court should
additionally consider the benefit, if any, accruing to the children of the parties from the
residential parent's underemployment").
131. For a discussion of the key role of judicial discretion in alimony decision making,
see UMDA, supra note 11 and accompanying text.
20061 229
230 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 13:203
much mothering is "appropriate" or "excessive" - a frightening pros-
pect for a mother facing a judge who thinks mothering is for babies.
C. The ALI Response
The ALI's response to the myth of The Excessive Mother begins
with identification of the norm of universal adult "labor-force partici-
pation."'32 While acknowledging the constraints childcare places on
a caretaker's ability to pursue paid employment, the ALI is clear that
"child support rules [should] not discourage the residential parent's
labor-force participation." 3' As the ALI explains:
During a child's minority, the interests of all parties
are generally best served by enabling the gainful employ-
ment of the residential parent to the extent consistent
with the needs of the child. When the child has grown
up, it is in the residential parent's interest to have
maximized the quality and quantity of past labor-force
participation.""
Imputation of income to a residential parent may be appropriate,
says the ALI, when "the residential parent is not caring for a child
of the parties under the age of six. .. ""' Too bad for caretakers
whose understanding of appropriate mothering conflicts with the
myth that mothering is for babies.
132. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 3.03 cmt. d.
133. Id. § 3.04, cmt. e.
134. Id. § 3.04, cmt. e. The ALI makes clear that its reference to the "needs of the
child" rather than a more generous standard such as the "best interests of the child,"
or other standard focusing on benefit, was no accident. Id. While a child may benefit
from parental attention, admit the drafters, fairness to the other parent may never-
theless requires a caretaker's "gainful employment." Id. Fairness to adults thus trumps
the best interests of the child. For a commentary on the ALI's child support scheme, see
Leslie Joan Harris, The ALI Child Support Principles: Incremental Changes to Improve
the Lot of Children and Residential Parents, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & PoLY 245, 252 (2001).
135. PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 3.15(1)(a) (emphasis added). This section continues:
"and is earning less than the parent could reasonably earn considering the parent's
residential responsibility for the children of the parties. .. ." Id.
An Appendix to the child support chapter of the Principles contains an alternative
formula with a supplementary award for low-income residential parents. Under § 3.052A,
a presumption arises that limitation of market employment in order to care for children
is appropriate when: "(a) the child is below the age of three; (b) three or more children
are below the age of 10; (c) the child is disabled; (d) the cost of child care required by the
residential parent's employment would exceed resultant earnings." Id. § 3.052 (A)(2).
This presumption "may be overcome by proof that limitation of market labor is inappro-
priate or excessive in terms of the children's needs." Id. § 3.052A(3) (emphasis added).
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IV. WHAT Now - A PARTNERSHIP POSTSCRIPT
"He has nothing on at all," cried at last the whole
people. That made a deep impression on the em-
peror, for it seemed to him that they were right;
but he thought to himself, 'Now I must bear up to
the end. 'And the chamberlains walked with still
greater dignity, as if they carried the train which
did not exist.
- The Emperor's New Clothes 3
It is time to put aside mother myths. Mothering does not just
happen; mothers are performing countless tasks in the daily work
of child rearing and homemaking. Mothering is not free; mothers com-
monly pay a hefty market price for their home efforts. Mothering is
not just for babies; mothers serve a valuable social function that im-
proves the quality of life, far beyond the diaper and pre-school years.
Debunking mother myths is not enough. It is also time to shed the
peculiar egalitarian model of marriage these myths support, a model
that falsely portrays real marriages and that confuses equality of
status with identity of contribution.
Help in fashioning a better model of marriage comes, again, from
partnership. Elsewhere I have argued that: partnership is an intui-
tive metaphor for marriage;'37 the language and principles of partner-
ship help shed gender-determinative marital roles; 138 partnership
offers a positive model for post-divorce income sharing that casts
mothers as equal stakeholders in marriage rather than pitiable casu-
alties of marriage; 13 an analogy to partnership buyouts provides a
useful mathematical model for alimony; 4 ° and an analogy to unfin-
ished partnership business supports a parenting-partnership model
for income-sharing during the minority of minor children.'4 ' Many
partnerships, for example, involve a specialization of labor in which
one partner contributes capital primarily or exclusively, while another
136. MICHAEL HAGUE'S FAVOURITE HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN FAIRY TALES 441 (Lily
Owens ed., 1981).
137. Displaced Homemaker, supra note 65, at 119-24.
138. Mothers as Suckers, supra note 53, at 1534-35.
139. Id. at 1527-38 (comparing a partnership model to the ALI's loss-sharing model).
140. Displaced Homemaker, supra note 65, at 124-38.
141. Mothers as Suckers, supra note 53, at 1544-52.
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contributes services primarily or exclusively. 4 2 Notwithstanding
the partners' different contributions, partnership default rules pro-
vide that "all partners have equal rights in the management and
conduct of the partnership business,"4 ' and profits and losses are
divided equally.' In practice, this default rule means that what-
ever the contribution of the individual partners, in the absence of
an agreement otherwise, they are equal in status and equally entitled
to any income either partner generates.
145
Like business partnerships, many marriages involve a special-
ization of labor in which one spouse primarily contributes capital
and the other services. In a quasi-traditional marriage, for example,
one spouse primarily contributes income through outside employ-
ment and the other primarily contributes household services, including
child care. No matter whether marital roles are traditional, quasi-
traditional, or truly egalitarian (both spouses assume full-time paid
employment and fifty percent of household chores), the default rule
should be that spousal partners are equal in status and equally en-
titled and obliged to share in the financial gains and losses produced
by the marriage.
If, as Bradford Wilcox and Steven Nock report, 46 women are
happiest in marriages with traditional divisions of labor, it is not be-
cause they have shed egalitarian attitudes, but because they do not
associate unequal contributions to home labor with inferior status.141
Perhaps these women understand something the law does not -
that equality of status is not a function of equality of contribution,
that even mothers who launder underwear can be equal partners in
marriage.
142. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, FUNDAMENTALs OFMODERN BUSINESS § 13.3.4 (1989).
143. UNIF. P'SHIPACT § 18(e) (2001) [hereinafter UPA]; see also REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP
ACT § 401(f). See generally DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND LLCS
§ 8.3 (2002).
144. UPA § 18(a).
145. Alicia Brokars Kelly has drawn an important connection between such a partner-
ship scheme and community property regimes. See Alicia Brokars Kelly, Rehabilitating
Partnership Marriage as a Theory of Wealth Distribution at Divorce: In Recognition of
a Shared Life, 19 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 141, 173 (2004). This scheme is also consistent with
Joan Williams's concept of a "family wage," although she does not endorse a partnership
metaphor for marriage. See WILLIAMS, supra note 73.
146. See Wilcox & Nock, supra note 2.
147. See id. at 1328, 1331 (finding support for the hypothesis that "[t]raditional wives
have lower expectations of marital equality in the division of household labor and emo-
tional work; consequently they will be happier with their marriages, and the marital
emotion work they receive, because they do not associate equity with equality") (em-
phasis added).
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CONCLUSION
Family law's model of marriage as a companionate, egalitarian
relationship in which spouses make equal or similar contributions
to work and home does not reflect the reality of many marriages.
The attractiveness of this simplistic model of equality lies partly in
three supporting mother myths: mothering just happens, mothering
is free, and mothering is for babies. Innocent as they may seem, these
myths pose great danger for divorcing mothers by creating fictional
baselines of appropriate behavior against which real mothers are
judged. While the ALI has taken steps toward slaying portions of these
myths, their ultimate demise depends on abandonment of the law's
egalitarian model of marriage and adoption of a model that distin-
guishes between status and contribution. Such a model lies in the
gender-neutral, equality-based principles and rules of partnership.
